Cold Boot Attack - Aspe Srl - Crittografia e Protezione Dati

Encryption and Data Protection
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Cold Boot Attack


BitLocker, Dm-Crypt, Filevault, TrueCrypt vulnerabili…
I buontemponi dell'Univercità di Princeton sono riusciti a leggere il contenuto delle DRAM dopo lo spegnimento del computer. Cosa significa? Significa che è possibile, e lo hanno fatto, recuperare dalla memoria la Master Key di uno dei sistemi di cifratura disconnettendo brutalmente la corrente e recuperando il contenuto della memoria, che in quel momento contiene la chiave.
In questo modo hanno ottenuto la Master Key e sono riusciti a decifrare BitLocker, Dm-Crypt, Filevault, TrueCrypt

I buontemponi:

Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems - BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt - using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.
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